BOOKLET ON ISSUES OF PEACE AND SECURITY


*** International Seminar on Indo-US Nuclear Deal**

10-12 March 2007

Mumbai - India

Edited by: Ms. Hamsa Abd El-Hamid Genidy

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Introduction

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal has created lot of concern not only in the Indian Sub-Continent but also in the international arena. Its consequences affect directly the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the world arms race, hegemonism, and other issues of great concerns.

We dedicate this issue of the booklet to present the main papers delivered at the international conference initiated by AAPSO in collaboration with CNDP to discuss this theme. The conference was convened in March 10 -12, 2007 in Mumbai , India under the title "Indo-US Nuclear Deal-India, South Asia, NAM and the Global Order".


Indian, regional and international researchers and academics participated at the conference and presented their papers under four sub-themes. They are as follows:

* "Indo-US Nuke Deal: India, NAM and the Emerging Global Order";
* "Indo-US Nuke Deal: Its impacts on Global and Regional Nuclear Arms Race";
* "Indo-US Nuke Deal: Its impacts on Global and Regional Energy Options"; and
* Strategy and Resolution.

The conference was followed by a Press Conference where the resolutions were presented and a discussion was held.

We hope to receive your comments on this subject and on others related to the world peace and security.

Hamsa Abd El-Hamid Genidy



U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement

The following is the text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (123 Agreement):

BEGIN TEXT:

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;

DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;

WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other's nuclear programmes;

DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;

NOTING the understandings expressed in the India - U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;

MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;

MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(A) "By-product material" means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.

(B) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.

(C) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another - for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.

(D) "Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.

(E) "Dual-Use Item" means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

(F) "Equipment" means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.

(G) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.

(H) "Information" means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the

public domain.

(I) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.

(J) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.

(K) "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

(L) "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. "Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material". Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.

(M) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose. Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.

(N) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.

(O) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.

(P) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

(Q) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:

a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;

b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;

c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;

d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;

e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors;

f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;

g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;

h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;

i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;

j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and

k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.

3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party

to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.

4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.

ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION

1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;

b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;

c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;

d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;

e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;

f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;

g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;

h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and

i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.

2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.

3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not

permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.

4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4 - NUCLEAR TRADE

1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.

2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.

ARTICLE 5 - TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.

2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.

3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.

4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the

loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.

5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.

6.

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

ARTICLE 6 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES

In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:

i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.

ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

ARTICLE 7 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical

protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.

2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.

3. The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 9 - PEACEFUL USE

Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.

ARTICLE 10 - IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA **[identifying data]** and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.

5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.

6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.

8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 11 - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the

impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

ARTICLE 12 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;

b) to avoid interference in such activities;

c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and

d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:

a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;

b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; or

c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.

3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.

ARTICLE 13 - CONSULTATIONS

1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.

2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving

the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.

3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.

ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION

1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.

5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.

6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.

8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 15 - SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.

ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.

ARTICLE 17 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.

2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.

3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.

Proportionality

For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.

By-product material

The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:

(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.

(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:
END TEXT

2007/658

Released on August 3, 2007

What's the India-US nuclear deal? What's wrong with it?

A note by the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

1. The United States Congress has recently passed an enabling legislation in favour of the India-US nuclear cooperation deal, called the "Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006" (Hyde Act). The broad outlines had been initially laid out in the joint statement issued by George Bush and Manmohan Singh on July 18 2005 during Indian PM's visit to the US. On March 2 2006, during President Bush's return visit to India, the joint statement issued captured the further developments in this regard. The US President has finally put his signature to the Act on December 18 last. But this does not amount to clinching of the "Deal". This, however, sets the stage, on a much surer footing, for negotiating the "123 Agreement", to amend Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954, to allow civilian cooperation with India.

India being a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) non-signatory, as are Pakistan and Israel, is not entitled to have such trading links with the outside world as of now. Hence it is imperative to make a unique exception in case of India and the need to amend the relevant law as it stands today. The US initiative in this respect evidently carries a strong element of unilateralism as it is out to subvert the current global order and consensus in this regard without any prior consultation whatever in any multilateral fora.

The "Deal" essentially promises that India would henceforth be entitled to civilian nuclear trade with the US and also other nations as regards its "civilian" nuclear plants once it classifies and separates its nuclear plants into two categories- "civilian" and "strategic" (or military) and opens up the "civilian" ones for international, i.e. IAEA, inspection. For the "strategic" ones there will neither be any inspection nor nay international cooperation. India will not have to give up its existing or future nuclear arsenals nor sign the NPT.

2. The actual "123 Agreement" - codifying the precise terms of cooperation and ensuring separation between the two categories of plants, the Bush administration is promising, would take care of certain Indian objections to the Hyde Act, as it has been framed by the US Congress through protracted and nerve-wracking debates and deliberations significantly diluting the âœpromisesâ? of the July 18, 2005 joint statement.

For instance, according to some reports, there will be no explicit reference to cooperation coming to an end if India conducts a nuclear blast. Instead, diplomatic, i.e. somewhat fuzzy, language will be used.

3. This, however, remains a matter of further negotiation. Moreover, it's not clear how far President Bush can actually tamper with the Hyde Act to meet Indian demands through the "123 Agreement".

There's a legal dispute over whether he has the power to amend the letter and

spirit of the Act as passed by the US Congress. Some lawmakers have protested the caveats, he entered while signing the Act into law, to the effect that the President is not bound by certain provisions, nor does he consider certain formulations a "statement of US policy".

Not only that, India will also have to negotiate a separate agreement with the IAEA codifying the terms of inspection.

These packages will then go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for approval through consensus and amendment of its own rule to accommodate these packages.

Only then it will again go back to the US Congress for its final approval. On obtaining the same, the US President would put his final signature and the "Deal" would then eventually come into force.

Indian parliament, unlike the US Congress, does not have to ratify the "Deal". But it, however, has the power to reject it through a special motion moved by its opponents.

In case, the "Deal" passes through the NSG but is rejected by the US Congress, for whatever reasons, India will then be entitled to have civilian nuclear trade with members of the NSG other than the US, subject to the specific member's willingness.

4. The Hyde Act evidently contradicts many commitments made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his Parliament statement of August 17, 2006, asserting that India won't accept any departure from the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements with the US.

These pertain to many issues including the scope of nuclear cooperation, freedom to stockpile fuel and reprocess spent fuel, scrutiny of India's nuclear activities, sequencing, etc. *(See Footnote I).*

5. Thus, the Hyde Act can legitimately be opposed on procedural grounds. But that can't be reason enough to reject the "Deal" without considering its substance. Nor should that be the approach to be adopted.

If the deal promotes worthy causes like peace, sustainable energy and policy independence for India, the procedural flaws might have been condoned.

But even if the "123 Agreement" corrects most or all of the procedural flaws, it would still remain fundamentally flawed and pose a grave threat to the prospects of world peace, global nuclear disarmament and regional stability. More so, as Indian demands for corrections address none of these concerns. Indeed these demands have a reverse orientation.

6. The "Deal" is essentially unworthy and, in fact, repugnant. The basic purpose of the US is to co-opt India as a new strategic ally, whose elite craves symbolic recognition as a nuclear weapons state and coveted approval from the Nuclear Club's leader. As Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, has said, the "Deal" is the "symbolic centre" of India-US relations - a collusive agreement to further the narrow sectional interests of the two state elites.

The "Deal" is inseparable from the larger objective of building an asymmetrical and unequal India-US "strategic partnership" geared to add momentum to the US drive for establishing unfettered global domination with the help of all kinds of regional allies that can be bought over.

India's cooperation, in this context, has become all the more critical in view of the disastrous consequences of the US invasion of Iraq severely undermining the drive, at least for the moment, for global domination.

Even demonstration of limited defiance of the US in terms of continued, even if curtailed, relationship with Iran and dalliance with Russia can in no way compensate for the moral and political damage caused by serving larger US game plans driven by the Indian ruling elite's obscene craze to emerge as a so-called global power as defined by the biggest power under whose shadow it will remain. All this in the name of pursuing "enlightened national interests".

7. The deal is the result, not of Indian, but US initiative: part of Washington's offer to help India become "a major world power in the 21st century" (as put by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).

India, as per this game plan, would become yet another of America's junior partners and join its system of strategic alliances, thereby subserving its Empire project. In particular, India would, as is being expected and may even be explicitly demanded, help contain China, and also other current and future adversaries of the US.

8. Little wonder, the Act calls for an Indian foreign policy that's "congruent to that of the US" and support for US goals, including isolating Iran, and for agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Ballistic Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence programmes aimed at giving the US domination of space, as well as its illegal naval interdiction plans embodied in its Proliferation Security Initiative. This will severely erode India's policy independence and limit India's global role to the American orbit, regardless of merits or demerits of a particular measure, just when it's in a strong position to influence world events.

Quite significantly, the July 2005 joint statement by Singh and Bush presents the nuclear deal bunched with a host of other moves towards increased "cooperation" including extensive collaboration in agriculture (through predatory technologies like genetically modified seeds, energy-intensive cultivation, and agro-processing) and strategic defence cooperation.

9. However, certain sections of the Indian critics of the Hyde Act, including the BJP, and part of the nuclear lobby, aren't opposed to real erosion of sovereignty, but only to some specific formulations in the Act allegedly causing erosion of India's nuclear sovereignty - the right and capacity to manufacture, develop, stockpile and deploy, nuclear warheads - the most lethal instrument of deliberate, indiscriminate and massive mass murder that the human race has as yet invented, at will. For them, sovereignty lies more in weapons of gruesome mass murder than in genuine policy independence or the welfare of the people. The Right has a militaristic and

chauvinistic idea of the national interest. It talks of sovereignty without acknowledging that it doesn't and must not extend to mass-destruction weapons or acts that can constitute crimes against humanity (through the use of such weapons).

10. The Right argues that the "Deal" will reduce India's access to nuclear fuel, cap India's programme for a "minimum credible deterrence" and keep it in "perpetual bondage" to Washington. Super-intrusive IAEA inspections, it claims, will undermine India's autonomy. A hysterical section of the Right also contends that India needs to conduct further nuclear tests to develop an "effective deterrent", through a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb. (It is widely recognised that India's 1998 H-bomb explosion was a dud.)

11. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 'Deal' would actually enable India to import natural or enriched uranium for power reactors, while conserving domestically produced uranium exclusively for military purposes. *(See Footnote II).*

This cannot but accelerate the arms race - both nuclear and conventional, with its next door neighbour Pakistan with attendant spine-chilling possibilities.

Never mind that Pakistan has been brusquely refused the same "Deal" by the US. It will in all probability find other means and ways to keep pace even at the obvious risk of self-destruction. Sanity demands that India must shun this dangerous slide down the slope.

12. The deal will promote nuclear electricity. But nuclear power is not appropriate, safe or economically viable. India's nuclear programme is marked by huge cost overruns, missed targets, and unsafe practices. Nuclear power is costly, prone to catastrophes like Chernobyl, and leaves enormous quantities of radioactive wastes and outlived plants, which cannot be safely stored or quarantined.

There are even today safe, affordable, renewable alternatives like wind and solar in contrast to this dirty technology.

13. Nuclear power enjoys gigantic subsidies running annually into thousands of crores, but delivers little except over-exposure to dangerous radioactivity, and unreliable, expensive electricity. By contrast, renewable energy sources have performed spectacularly. India's total installed wind power capacity now stands at an impressive 6,270 MW (ref. <http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Skins/TOI/Client.asp?Daily=TOIM&login=suklasen&Enter=true&Skin=TOI&GZ=T&AppName=1>), compared to highly subsidised nuclear's around 3,500 MW. (Ref. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html>). India's wind energy potential is currently estimated as 45,000 MW. (Ref. <http://www.indianwindpower.com/press release.htm >). Other renewables too are becoming competitive. They are safe and don't leave toxic residues.

Every additional rupee invested in nuclear power would mean a rupee less for alternative power with the promise of being far more productive just not in the long run but even in the immediate present.

14. Contrary to the claim that nuclear power is necessary for energy security,

self-reliance and prosperity; it contributes less than 3 percent to India's electricity generation. Even if the Atomic Energy Department's always-overambitious target of producing 20,000 MW by 2020 is achieved, its contribution will only increase to around 7 percent by then. (Ref. www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/bucknamJan07.asp). That's still marginal.

But DAE targets have never been met. Had its original plans materialised, India would have had 10,000 MW of nuclear electricity by 1980 and over 50,000 MW by now - 15 times the actual achievement.

And indigenous uranium production as of now is much less than sufficient even to maintain the current level of meagre production - far too little for energy self-sufficiency.

15. The deal will "normalise" and legitimise not just India's nuclear weapons, but also the US's. India will develop a vested interest in perpetuating both. This will betray the UPA's promise to update the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Plan for global nuclear disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly, and to fight for a nuclear weapons-free world.

16. The deal will trigger nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, and between India and China, which is likely to build up its arsenal as it sees India entering into a close collusive relationship with the US and stockpiling more plutonium. This will destabilise the Asian continent and the larger world, and will grievously harm India's own security.

17. In sum, the "Deal" as and when, and if at all, comes through will grievously undermine the current global regime of nuclear non-proliferation and thereby also the prospects of global nuclear disarmament by sending a dangerously wrong message to those threshold nations aspiring to go nuclear; by further reinforcing India's nuclear ambitions and consequently Pakistan's drive; and in the process by further legitimising continued possession of nuclear arsenals by the recognised nuclear weapons States.

It is going to further aggravate tensions and accelerate arms race in the region.

It will further cement the growing strategic ties between the US and India and thereby would add momentum to the US project for unfettered global dominance.

It will furthermore act as a booster for nuclear energy industry and a considerable dampener for efforts to develop ecologically benign renewable sources of energy - nationally and also globally.

The "Deal" is thus a false and Faustian bargain. It must be opposed - no matter what concessions the US makes through the "123 Agreement", or by pushing India's case in the IAEA or the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

Footnotes:

I. Dr Singh declared that India would accept nothing short of "full" civilian nuclear cooperation. But the Act bars India's access to uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and heavy water technologies.

· India didn't want any reference to a future nuclear test in the law. The Act says all cooperation would be instantly stopped if India conducts a nuclear test.

· Dr Singh opposed annual "certification" by the US President of India's compliance with its non-proliferation pledges. The Act merely changes "certification" to "assessment".

· India insisted it should be able to stockpile nuclear fuel to create "strategic reserves" over "the lifetime" of its reactors so supply interruptions won't affect their working. The Act only permits fuel imports for the operating requirements of reactors and non-strategic reserves.

· India wanted the sequencing of steps in the deal's completion to be strictly "reciprocal" to Washington's moves. These include the India-US "123 agreement" - so named because it amends section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act (1954) -, approval for the deal from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers' Group, and a special safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Dr Singh said India wouldn't implement safeguards until restrictions on nuclear commerce are lifted through the "123 agreement". But the Hyde Act demands that India take the IAEA safeguards agreement to the penultimate stage before the "123 agreement".

· Dr Singh said India would "oppose any ... scrutiny of ... our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. "But the Act mandates the US President to scrutinise India's nuclear activities.

II. · India has currently about 500 kg of weapons-grade plutonium from its CIRUS and Dhruva reactors, enough for 100 Bombs. This itself is much more than any commonsensical definition of "credible minimum deterrent" - a highly dangerous and questionable concept in the first place. But in addition, India has 11,500 kg of reactor-grade plutonium in the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded reactors.

· India is only putting 14 out of 22 nuclear reactors under safeguards. The remaining eight reactors can potentially produce 1,250 kg of plutonium a year - enough for 125 bombs. In addition, Fast-Breeder Reactors will yield 130 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for 25 bombs a year. Before CIRUS is shut down by 2010, it will yield another 45 kg of plutonium, while the Dhruva reactor will continue to add about 20-25 kg/year. India plans to construct a new unsafeguarded reactor at least as big as Dhruva.

· Thanks to the deal, India can divert enough domestic uranium for military purposes for 12 to 20 additional nuclear bombs a year!

(See: http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf.)

Comments by E.A.Vidyasekera

The issue under discussion has its ramification throughout the world. There is no area or the region which has not refrained from criticizing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. This deal has created more confusion among the countries regarding the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The biggest nuclear power, the United States by entering into this treaty with India, a country which is not a signatory to the treaty, has taken a unilateral position in violating the NPT, which is a serious matter and has global implications.

Region wise the deal has brought to South Asia and also to West Asia a great danger of nuclear proliferation. In Asia, China and Pakistan are nuclear powers and both countries are contiguous to India, and it aggravates the relations among these countries further. On the other hand the United States is threatening Iran against its nuclear program which Iran says is for peaceful purposes of creating electricity. At the instigation of the US , Iran nuclear issue has already been placed in the UN Security Council. Israel is the third country after India and Pakistan not having signed the NPT. Further , although not openly declared, Israel is considered to posses nuclear weapons. To protect Israel from any possible military attack from Iran, US is threatening the peaceful nuclear program of Iran. With the Palestinian issue unsettled and the US invasion of Iraq and the Israel attack on Lebanon, the situation in this region is volatile and unstable.

In this regard I would like to mention a bout the "Vanunu case" in Israel. As you know an Israel citizen Vanunu was a technician in the nuclear facility in Israel and he had foreseen the dangers of the nuclear facilities in Israel in an event of a major accident. Israel being a small territory in land space, such an accident would have disastrous consequences in the whole neighboring countries , including the Mediterranean and North Africa. Vanunu has expressed this to media in Europe, as he could not have made such a statement within Israel. The Israel secret police kidnapped Vanunu, brought him to Israel and charged him as a traitor and was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment. Vanunu remained calm. Even after 18 years of jail he is not allowed to leave the country. His movements are restricted and closely watched. But still nobody knows how safe is Israeli nuclear facilities. Further according to nuclear deal, Indian will build several nuclear reactors, and its civilian program will be expanded. Once it is finalized, US may pressure India to buy more nuclear technology from the United States and also Uranium from friendly countries such as Australia.

This will again violate the NPT as Australia is not supposed to sell Uranium to non-signatory of NPT. Hence the US India Nuclear Deal has created chaos and the NPT is exposed to more dangers. Further the disarmament process will take a backseat and the arms race will continue at a rapid space.

* Secretariat - coordinator of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization on "Indo-US Nuclear Deal- Its impacts on Global and Regional Nuclear Arms Race".

Although Iran has openly declared that its has no intention of nuclear weaponry, where as Pakistan is already a nuclear weapon state. As such Pakistan cannot be prevented from any nuclear cooperation with a third nuclear country. It is no secret that there had been clandestine nuclear activity between Pakistan and North Korea in the past and whether this can be stopped in future nobody will know. Therefore no peace loving country or people can support the nuclear deal as it creates more suspicion than confidence among people.

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THE INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

Hamsa Abd El-Hamid Genidy*

During the last 50 years there was a great US hostility and differences between India and the US and it intensified in the nuclear arena. While on today India becomes a key strategic partner to the US.

They signed a number of accords such as the launching of Indian satellite licensed by the US, strengthening cooperation to fight AIDS, 40 Indian universities will cooperate with American ones in the areas of biotechnology, food pro-cessing, and marketing, the deal for spreading democracy, and others such as the "Indo-US Nuclear Deal".

On the surface, this deal seemed to be a "win-win agreement" for both of them. As for of India, it is known it has a shortage of energy sources and there are restrictions in its access to the nuclear technology as the result of the sanctions imposed in India after its first nuclear test en in 1974.However, all this will be changed with this nuclear agreement, the sanctions will be lifted. India will be able to access to long-denied civilian nuclear technology, and will be provided with uranium fuel that would be used to produce as many nuclear weapons as it wants. Also, US will allow cooperation between India and other nuclear supplier Group countries. So, India will be recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State with advanced nuclear technology.

As for the US, this agreement will open new markets in Asia where it can export its nuclear industry: equipment and technology as well as technical workers.

In reality, if we study this deal in depth, we will find the U.S. needs to engage India in its global scheme. It wants to use India as a bulwark in Asia against some countries that US disagrees and dislikes their policies such as Iran, Pakistan and China and others. By doing this, the US will be able to accomplish its ambitious dream of dominating the world and to establish the unipolar system of hegemony in the world.

America's global strategy benefits from Indian participation in building a new world order. This idea is only a part of a geopolitical move against China, Iran , Pakistan and all countries critical of U.S., drive them for arms race and destabilization in Asia.

Iran for example, is a main actor in the global energy market. It is the second biggest oil aft producer in the OPEC, and it has about % 10 of the international oil reserve. It has the world second reserve of natural gas.

Though 9/11 event, Iran managed to clear itself of being accused of participating in such an event, the war on Afghanistan and the removing of Taliban in Kabul, and the war on Iraq and overthrow of Saddam's regime in 2003, all of these factors with others resulted in the emergence of new geo-political position in the central Asia.

* Secretary of the International Section of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), headquartered in Cairo.

Accordingly, this gives more space for Iran to extend its power and develop its nuclear capabilities, which is not acceptable to the U.S.

Therefore, the US tries to create the image of Iran as an enemy against the Arab World countries that is more dangerous than Israel so that they may be pushed to be involved in a conflict with Iran, while the U.S. will watch and enjoy.

The same is happening now in India which is being used to send Iran a message concerning its insistence on having an independent nuclear development program while the U.S. will share the nuclear "know-how" technology and fuel with India, although it is not a signatory to NPT like Iran.

Since the visit of the former Iranian President Mohamed Khatami to India in 2003, the bi-lateral relation becomes a "strategic partnership" in energy field. The then Indian its Petroleum minister stated that the year 2004--2005 would witness several deals with Iran. Some has already signed and others are under studying.

The biggest project in this strategic part-nership is, the project of natural gas pipelines from Iran to India across Pakistan.

The effects of this project go beyond any expectations for economic cooperation signed between any two countries because it will enable India to access to energy resources and paves its way to its international ascendancy. For India, this pipeline project is crucial since it can be cross-linked with central Asia and China and with ports in India and Pakistan. Of course, the U.S. is against such partnership due to its own consideration.

There is no doubt; the US companies are already dominating the oil in the East Asia. Now after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US is of trying to dominate over oil and gas in Central Asian and Caspian Region. It is along with Europe rapidly building infrastructure to pump oil and gas resources across Europe via the Mediterranean, to monopolize these resources and marginalize Russia.

Moreover, the US exerted no pressures on India to join the campaign against Iran's nuclear file. The American Ambassador to India Mr.Mulford linked the implementation of this Indo--US Agreement with Indian behaviours towards- Iran's nuclear file.

At the end, India voted twice against Iran in the IAEA and agreed to refer the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council.

India pursues a double standard policy towards Iran. It tightens the rope on Iran in its nuclear file and continues its relation with it in a way that reports mentioned India has been training Iranian troops which is being denied later on.

It is evident the India is taking the "parallel line" till now, but with any military escala-tion against Iran, India has to choose between the bigger global partner the US or the regional strategic partner which guarantees its eco-nomic growth and access to central Asia and Afghanistan, that is Iran.

Both China and Pakistan are against this deal, in a way that can encourage Pakistan to do the same with China, especially after the US's nor refusal to sign a

similar deal with Pakistan because of concerns over Pakistan's record as being accused of helping nuclear proliferation. That is why after 9/11 America started to look at New Delhi as important to stop Pakistan from supporting militancy in Kashmir, and during the US war on Afghanistan, Pakistan which is considered the most competitor to India in the political and military fields had its international position been weakened. Now, after the Indo-US Deal, Pakistan fears the ever-growing gap the between it and India.

All this could affect the on going peace initiative between India and Pakistan and will further boost its military modernization efforts.

The same will happen with China that presents the most significant threat to both India and the US as it seems an emerging power.

On commentary on this deal, China stated clearly it is against. Any "move towards nuclear proliferation, and nuclear deal between US and India must conform to follow generally accept-ed rules with provisions of international NPT".

Not only China is against this deal but also other nuclear supplier group such as Germany, Japan, South Africa, etc.

China could be tempted to support the nuclear programme in Iran and Pakistan as a countermove.

On the contrary, the US considers China and Russia together pose a serious challenge, which could be formidable force if India were to join them. The US goals is to ensure India does not do this. Furthermore it seeks to break any normalization between India and China.

Also, this deal will affect badly on the ongoing process of discussion regarding the denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula.

Finally, The US uses the selective use of the carrot and stick to tie India to its geo-political strategy and ambitions. This deal in fact would accelerate arms race in Asia rather than nuclear disarmament.

The US is also seeking India into a defence partnership that would make India depend on the US for all nuclear energy initiatives.

Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) calls for the establishment for an Asian and a Middle East zones free of weapons of mass destructions.

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Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Its Impact on Non -Alignment

By

A.A.M. Marleen*

Indo- US Nuclear Deal and Its Impact on Non- Alignment

Almost a decade and half ago India and the United States signing a nuclear treaty was almost unimaginable. Some may even consider it a fiction. But today it is a reality due to the fast changing international political scene where the old order - collapsed and the old enemies have become new friends paving the way for new alignments creating new realities.

Thus the entire political map of the world had undergone some changes .This was the inevitable outcome of the collapse of former Soviet Union in 1990 ending the almost three quarter century of Cold War giving way to a unipolar world where the United States has emerged as the most powerful country in the known human history.

People all over the world, even countries aligned with the former Soviet Union,

were happy that the United States, claiming to be the champion and guardian of freedom, democracy, human rights and all such values, had emerged as the sole super power. They all thought, in fact they dreamt that the US would wipe out dictatorships and oppressions all over the world, spread much talked about democratic principles and values and make this planet a peaceful one for everyone to live in harmony. But it did not take long for people all over the world to realize that this was only a distant dream as the powerful and destructive forces such as weapons and oil industries, financial oligarchies and corporate conglomerates had their own agenda which, within a decade and half today, made this planet a global killing field and a graveyard.

This was possible because the powerful Western media, owned by these corporate forces, help mislead the world and shape the public opinion to suit their agendas. It was in this context we need to view the growing Indo-US relations and its growing impact on the Non -Aligned Movement.

One of the most unfortunate developments in the global political scene which emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union was the virtual and inevitable collapse of the Non- Aligned Movement. It almost dealt a death blow to the Non -Aligned Movement at a time when it was in its zenith of its influence in the regional and international forums. Within decades Non- Aligned movement had

* President's Counsel of AAPSO and Secretary - General of Afro-Asian Solidarity Association of Sri Lanka

emerged as the sole and effective voice and grievances of developing countries. To understand the current plight of Non- Aligned Movement I would like to highlight in brief the history of this movement.

As we all know after almost four to five centuries of European colonial rule which plundered their resources, one after the other Asian, Africa and Latin American countries started gaining independence and freeing themselves from their colonial masters especially in the 1950s and 1960s.

It was the time when the world was divided into two: one dominated by the West led by United States and the other the Communist bloc led by Soviet Union. Both the Western powers and the Soviet Union began competing to spread their zones of influence in the new nations. As a result these nations became battlegrounds for the two super powers with devastating impacts and that too at a time when they were struggling to take their countries forward to ensure a better life for their people.

Some of these countries sided with their colonial Western masters while others, asserting their dignity and independence, turned to Soviet Union. Realizing the disadvantages of aligning with one power many decided to be independent and thus came into being the concept of Non Alignment.

But many involved in the "Third World "politics were highly skeptical about the concept of non alignment. Only in the 1960s with Vietnam defeating the United States and revolutionary government such as Cuba, Mozambique, Laos and Cambodia adopting the policy of Non -Alignment the concept of non alignment gathered momentum and became a major issue in the world politics.

Some of the prime movers and founding fathers were President Tito of Yugoslavia, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Dr Sukarno of Indonesia.

While the Soviet Union encouraged and assisted the Non Alignment Movement as a buffer against the West, the United States and the Western Europe dismissed and treated them adversely. The United States was furious when the 1973 Algiers Conference of Heads of States of Non- Aligned countries demanded more control of their natural resources. This was the natural response of colonial powers and the US corporatism that plundered the resources of third world countries.

In the subsequent decades the Non-Aligned movement gathered momentum and emerged as a very powerful voice in the United Nations and all other international forums highlighting and exposing the Western injustices and hypocrisy. The United States and Western Europe continued to attack Non Aligned countries in the United Nations and used aid to blackmail the Third World countries.

But the NAM steadfastly supported all liberation struggles. They continued to expose Western crime against the Third World especially their support to the Zionist Jewish crimes against Palestinians. It was purely due to the initiative of non aligned countries that the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring Zionism as racist.

Naturally the Zionist Jewish lobbies which control United States and Europe were all out to crush the Non -Aligned Movement and that moment came when they engineered and brought down the Soviet Union and thereby removed the important support base for the Non Aligned Movement.

Thus with the collapse of Soviet Union, the Non-Aligned Movement was thrown into doldrums at a time when the Non-Aligned movement has emerged as an influential voice of the developing world.

This also placed the third world giant India, an ardent advocate of Non- Aligned Movement, aligned for long with Soviet Union, in a very difficult situation. In the fast changing global political and economic environment India cannot remain a spectator but to change it's political and economic policies to suit the need of the hour and protect its national interests.

India was quick to introduce changes to meet the situation. India opened up its economy, introduced liberal incentives to attract foreign investments, improved ties with the West and even established diplomatic relations with Israel and adapted itself to the changing international global political and economic scene.

As a result India's commitment to Non-Aligned countries began to erode. India was not in a position to assist the Non-Aligned Movement in the way it did in the past. Overnight the Non-Aligned Movement became irrelevant and leading non aligned countries were left to the mercy of the United States and the Western Europe which were all out to destroy Non-Aligned Movement and did not waste time to crush it. India's new economic policy and new political alignments paid well to serve its national interests.

The Indian economy recorded an average annual growth of around 6% over the past decade and 8% per year over the past three years-among the fastest rates in the world. With an emerging middle class, increasing gross domestic product, exports, employment and foreign investment complemented by a roaring stock market, low external debt and large foreign exchange reserves India today is a growing super power with all potentials to change the balance power in Asia and the world.

Wealthier nations and their leaders who visit India consider it as a country with enormous trading potentials. The result was the ever growing Indian ties with the West in general and the United States in particular. This climaxed in the signing of a nuclear deal between India and the United States.

Thus sandwiched between its relations with the West which benefited the country a great deal, politically, economically and even militarily and its commitment to Non-Aligned Movement of developing countries squeezed by the Western corporate conglomerates under the guise of globalization and open economy, India was placed in a dilemma.

Inevitable outcome was, opinion may differ, India compromising its commitment towards Non-Aligned Movement.

Two main tests came when India established diplomatic ties with Israel and its subsequent flourishing defense co-operations and the US President George Bush's illegal and fraudulent invasion of Iraq - a fiercely non aligned and almost a developed country with people enjoying a very high standard of living, very high literacy rate, health and other facilities.

The Non-Aligned Movement had been in the forefront highlighting the crime and injustices committed by the Jewish state of Israel. No other movement so vehemently and consistently supported the unfortunate Palestinians' sufferings and condemned the oppressive racist policies of Israelis on Palestinians than the Non -Aligned Movement. Even today Israel, known for its crime records, lawlessness destabilizing the entire Middle East region, continues its barbarity unabated and remains a stigma on the civilized society.

As one of the founders of the Non-aligned Movement India too supported the Palestinian struggle for liberation and condemned the Zionist atrocities on Palestinians. This was done as a matter of policy. Israel is a state which came into being by manipulating the United Nations. Its crime records, barbarity and oppression acts continue even unabated. Yet India recognized and established diplomatic relations with Israel.

Of course it is a well known fact and reality that the road to the heart to better relations with the West, especially the United States, is through Israel because Jews are the real and invisible rulers of the US and the West. So the better relations with the West comes as a reward for recognizing Israel and turn a blind eye to its crime on Palestinians.

Certainly a third world giant like India or for that matter any other country, cannot have good relations with Israel and yet be Non-Aligned. Thus India's growing relations with Israel was a deadly blow to the Non-Aligned Movement which for decades fiercely condemned the oppressive and aggressive Zionist policies on Palestinians. Now India needs to do the impossible task of striking a balance between its fast growing relations with oppressive Israel and its support to legitimate rights of Palestinians and Non -Aligned Movement.

One should not forget that the Israeli flag is also flying high even in Cairo, another founder of the Non-Aligned movement, once the inspiring centre for Afro Asian liberation movement but now being neutralized to turn a blind eye to Zionist crimes ignoring the plight of Palestinians.

Meanwhile the United States invasion of Iraq also placed India in a delicate and difficult situation because Iraq, as one of the strongest supporters of Non Aligned Movement promoted the Non-Aligned cause. This non aligned country, subjected for twelve long years to cruel United States and UK sponsored and Arab supported UN economic sanctions, some described it as genocide, is under US and UK occupation. Four years after this invasion almost a million innocent civilians were killed, more than a million displaced within the country and more than two million ended up in refugee camps turning this country into a slaughter house.

Now here too India is in a dilemma. On the one hand India wants closer ties with US which is raping and destroying non aligned Iraq. On the other hand criticizing this heinous crime means antagonizing President Bush's destructive Iraqi policy. This certainly placed India's non aligned policy under severe strain. This policy began to erode further with Indian defense experts even openly calling for a New Delhi-Tel Aviv-Washington political and military axis. Climaxing the growing Indo- -US ties was the Indo US Nuclear deal which sucked India to the West extremely hostile to the Non -Aligned Movement.

In this scenario comes the recent claim by a former high-ranking official of the Bush administration, in a talk on 'Iran, North Korea and the future of the NPT' at India's Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)' that India's votes against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were 'coerced'. "The best illustration of this is the two votes India cast against Iran at the IAEA," he said, adding: "I am the first person to admit that the votes were coerced".

With India being dragged into the Western orbit and its economy thriving, certainly India cannot cling on to fast fading Non -Aligned Movement and lose all the benefits the country had gained.

On the other hand, in his arrogant and reckless policy of blackmailing non aligned countries President Bush warned that "either you are with us or with the terrorists" in his so called war on terrorism .This sent a clear message to Non-Aligned countries align with US and benefit or face the consequences both political and economic.

This was a crippling blow to poor Afro-Asian Non- Aligned countries because antagonizing the US means depriving political and the much needed economic aid for poor non aligned countries.

The message was loud and clear when Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy US Defense Secretary, and one of the main architects of US war on Iraq, was appointed as the Chairman of World Bank. Certainly the World Bank will help only those countries which toe the US line and its destructive campaign on terrorism.

As a result most developing non aligned countries were forced to toe US ,line and this dealt another serious blow to Non-Aligned Movement. Using financial aid as a weapon the World Bank can blackmail and exploit the poor non aligned countries to toe its guidelines in violation of non aligned policies and principles. What could the third world countries badly in need of financial assistance do under such circumstances? This is yet another blow to the Non Aligned Movement which needs to choose between non aligned principles and World Bank assistance. Thus inevitably the non aligned movement began fading as an effective movement as it was before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

India's eroding role on the Non-Aligned Movement became visible during the 14th Non-Aligned Summit held in the Cuban Capital Havana from September 15 to 17 last year.

In this regard I quote what the popular Indian fortnightly Frontline October 2006 had to say with regard to Indian performance at this summit. Frontline added that the

Declaration called for the urgent restructuring of the U.N. system, including an expansion of the Security Council and a provision to allow Security Council vetoes to be overruled by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. U.N. Secretary--General Kofi Annan, who was in Havana to attend the summit, supported the call for reforms. The U.S. was invited to attend the summit, but it refused even to acknowledge the invitation.

The Declaration condemned Israel's attacks on Lebanon and supported a peaceful resolution of the U.S.-Iran nuclear dispute.

There was a clarion call for comprehensive global nuclear disarmament in the Declaration. Many member-states wanted region-specific nuclear-free zones. This proposal was vetoed by India.

Many of the leaders highlighted in their speeches the fact that the national sovereignty of countries was being routinely trampled upon because of their refusal to subscribe to the dictates of the West. Raul Castro said in his speech that the U.S. spent more than $1 billion a year on weapons and soldiers. "To think that a social and economic order that has proved unsustainable can be maintained by force is simply an absurd idea," he said. In comparison, the Indian Prime Minister trod a cautious path. There was no direct criticism of Washington's "unilateralist" policies that have destabilized the world since September 2001. He quoted from one of Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches, in which he stated that "non-alignment is freedom of action which is a part of independence". Manmohan Singh said the cooperative worldview of NAM rejected notions like "clash of civilizations". He pointed out that the movement encompassed different religions, ideologies, ethnic groups and cultures. Manmohan Singh said NAM's message to the world should be that it is possible to work for a "confluence of civilizations". He also talked about the need for the democratization of the U.N. system. "We must join hands with other like-minded countries to promote democratization of the process of global governance, ushering in a new global polity based on the rule of law, reason and equity," he said.

Manmohan Singh said "the emerging fault lines" in international politics were the most visible in West Asia. He expressed the view that NAM was "uniquely placed" to play a constructive role in the restoration of peace and harmony in that region. He also called for a major NAM initiative on Africa. The initiative, he said, should focus on human resource and agricultural development. He also invoked Mahatma Gandhi by saying that NAM should be an embodiment of moderation, harmony and reason. With the Indian nuclear deal with the U.S. on the verge of being finalized, he was careful in choosing his words in an arena hostile to Washington.

Behind the scenes, India played its usual "moderating" role, helping to water down the tough rhetoric the majority would have preferred to use in the Declaration. Indian officials have been wary about the "activism" shown by NAM since Malaysia took over the chairmanship three years ago. They have felt that the focus has been on an "Islamic agenda" since 2003. A senior official said that irrespective of whether NAM was relevant or not, India could not afford to disassociate itself from the movement. Indian diplomacy, however, could not expunge the word "hegemony!" from the final

text.

India succeeded in seeing that the Declaration was "ideologically neutral". It also voiced its opposition to the proposal to formalize a NAM "troika", comprising the former, present and next Presidents. Given the strong opinion that was prevalent among the majority of NAM members, India had no option but to go along with the resolution supporting Palestine.

In fact Belgrade, Cairo, Delhi,Jakarta were the four main centers of early non Aligned Movement and all of them have undergone radical changes. Non- Aligned is a dead letter in Cairo where the government, in my opinion, was neutralized by the United States and Israel. Belgrade has been in tatters since the collapse of former Soviet Union. Jakarta was brought under US orbit after the US backed military coup which ousted President Ahmed Soekarno, killed around half a million intellectuals and placed General Suharto in power under a ruthless military dictatorship. Though Havana remains unchanged it has its own limitations. Only country left to lead the NAM was India .But New Delhi's growing political, military and economic ties with the US and Israel hamper this task.

Sadly all indications are that despite all rhetoric's and summits such as the Havana gatherings, Non -Aligned Movement will not be an effective forum as it had been in the past and may disappear on its own unable to withstand changing global political scenes.

Although this eventuality may not be the wish of any of us it may regrettably be the reality.

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Indo-US Nuclear Deal :
India, South Asia, NAM and the Global Order

Paper contributed by :

ATTY. ANTONIO E. PARIS*

Progressive people in the Philippines and other parts of Asia have historically looked up to India as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement in this part of the world, and therefore as a bulwark against foreign (primarily US) political interference, military pressures and economic diktat upon countries of this region which are trying to chart independent paths of development. India will always be remembered for "Panchasila" or the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement.

For a long time even after the so-called "end of the Cold War" and the demise of the socialist community in Eastern Europe, India was perceived to be a power that can be relied upon to defend the Bandung Spirit of peaceful co-existence among nations, and of cooperation for progress among developing countries. However, there have been drastic changes in perception about India's positions since the Indo-US Nuclear "Deal" which was outlined in the July 2005 joint statement of Dubya Bush and PM Manmohan Singh in Washington DC.

The Indo-US Nuclear "Deal" strikes a blow against the campaign for global nuclear disarmament. This virtual legitimization of India's nuclear weapons capability is practically tearing up the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the only multilateral commitment towards nuclear disarmament of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. (Note: Here clearly is an example of the US double standard: while preparing to provide India with nuclear materials, the USA is girding for war to squash Iran's attempt to develop a nuclear capability which is cited to be in violation of the NPT.)

The "Deal" would allow India to utilize all its indigenously-produced uranium exclusively for the production of fissile ("atomic bomb") materials. In turn, this would prod rival Pakistan to step up its own nuclear weapons program to keep pace with India, thus turning the South Asian region more volatile. More than this, other parts of the bigger "Deal" have other negative repercussions for our whole continent.

Given the increasing cooperation in the India-US Defense Policy Group, and the "Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism", there are fears that India would now serve as the modern-day Sepoy for US expansionist interests in Asia. US policies, especially under the present Bush regime, are the exact opposite of the social responsibility, democratic accountability and moral values that the Non-Aligned Movement is espousing, and cooperation with the US on policy matters and on "counter-terrorism" would have negative impacts on the Indian people, on India's

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neighboring countries, and on India's role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Previously, the only US ally in the sub-continent was Pakistan, which hosted training camps for the jihadists who were sent to fight the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan (including some Filipino jihadists who later formed terrorist bands after returning to our country). Pakistan under the Musharraf's dictatorship remains a major ally of the USA , and is the fifth-largest recipient of US aid. It is to receive USD $785-Million from Bush's next budget, which includes USD $300-Million in direct aid for the Pakistani armed forces which is Musharraf's power base.

US support for General Musharraf and his military (who staged a coup d'etat in 1999) is meant to project the idea that they are the only viable option to govern Pakistan, and that they are indispensable in Bush's war against the remaining Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces which are reported to be regrouping in Pakistan's tribal region bordering Afghanistan. Keeping the Musharraf's military dictatorship in control allows the USA to contain protests against its unilateral air strikes against targets within Pakistani territory.

However, the Musharraf's dictatorship remains a reluctant partner in Bush's war on Islamic extremism. Musharraf continues to categorize as "freedom fighters" those jihadists active in Kashmir , while the Pakistani military in general are reluctant to fight those jihadists whom they previously supported and trained in the war against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan.

The Musharraf's regime also needs the extremist religious parties to help keep out from the political scene moderate leaders such as former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf also reckons that his projection as the bringer of democracy to the Muslim world would suffer with a consistent anti-extremist campaign.

This reluctance on the part of the Musharraf's dictatorship is a factor in the US alliance with the Singh regime in India. The Singh regime is perceived not only as a partner in "globalization", but also as a strategic ally against the Moslem world in general. The Singh regime opened up India to "free" trade, greater deregulation, and wider privatization and corporatization. It supports the strengthening of Hindu nationalism and the emasculation of organized labor, and is drifting towards more authoritarian methods of rule. Under the Singh regime, American-style capitalism has become the model of the Indian power elite.

Surely, the Singh regime would crow that due to its capitalist-friendly policies, India now has the most number of billionaires in Asia, based on the Forbes Magazine's 2007 ranking of the world's richest people. The Forbes Magazine reported that India has 36 billionaires with a total net worth of USD $191-Billion, pushing Japan to the second slot with only 24 billionaires with a total net worth of USD $64-Billion. However, billions of profits from American-style capitalism has everywhere led, even in the Philippines, to the destruction of the environment, to abject poverty for great masses of the working people, and to other deleterious social consequences. India cannot be an exception to this.

While previous Indian governments stood in solidarity with oppressed peoples and national liberation movements, in line with the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Singh's regime practically turned its back on the Palestinian people and became a main partner of the Zionist state of Israel . In 2005, India bought nearly USD $2-Billion worth of weaponry from Israel , thus becoming the prime customer of Israel's "defense" industry. Also, India is now the second largest trading partner of Zionist Israel . The Indo-US Nuclear "Deal" is a logical result of the Singh regime's policies of deregulating capitalist plunder, of embarking on heavy militarization, of enriching Israel's criminal military-industrial complex, and of tolerating fascist trends and Hindu chauvinism (Hindutva) within India.

The Singh regime is therefore considered as an ideal ally in Bush's "War on Terror". Its close alignment with the USA and Israel, its continued undeclared war with Pakistan over Kashmir, its pursuit of domination over Muslim Bangladesh and other neighboring countries, and its discriminatory policies and practices against Indian Muslims, are its main credentials as an ally. It is within this context that the Indo-US Nuclear "Deal" was forged, and it is within this context also that India under the Singh's regime is losing its role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Progressive peoples throughout the world have the obligation of appealing to the Indian government to rejoin the ranks of countries struggling for freedom and democracy, to stand in solidarity with all peoples fighting against imperialist and Zionist oppression, and to regain its leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement. However, at the end of the day, it remains for the Indian people to put mass pressure on their government to do these.

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DON'T WORRY - IT'S ONLY THE END OF THE WORLD
THE ALMOST FORGOTTEN APOCALYPSE

India's place in the context of the urgent need for global nuclear disarmament

By

John Hallam*

Introduction

This article was initially written in the immediate aftermath of Kofi Annan's Princeton address of November 28 2006, and the Rome Declaration. Since then, Kissinger, Nunn, Schultz and others have written calling for nuclear abolition in the Wall St Journal and Mikhail Gorbachev has written in similar vein.

I have decided to use it to place India, and the India-US Deal into a global context of nuclear disarmament, and to underline the absolute urgency of that need as emphasised by the most eminent people in the world so recently. I will speak more about regional and global arms-racing than the 'Deal' as such, which is analysed more competently by others.

The urgent need for global nuclear disarmament is intimately connected with the need for nuclear risk reduction and disarmament between India and Pakistan, Indeed, if India and Pakistan can begin to transform their own relationship and commence a nuclear build-down (the opposite of the current arms-race), they could then play a vital role in leading the rest of the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons as per article VI of the NPT and the year 2000 NPT Review Conference final declaration.

Clearly the 'Deal' between India and the US does nothing to further the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, at a time when so many eminent people have declared that the future of the human race depends on that taking place. Instead it legitimates India's nuclear weapons, and will lead to further nuclear arms racing in the subcontinent.

Globally it will simply encourage those nations that want to have nuclear weapons that they should acquire them. The NPT regime as a whole will be drastically weakened.

Whatever criticisms we may have of the NPT, the world is better off with it than without it, and without its credibility being eroded piecemeal by 'exceptional' deals such as the current one.

To make more sense of India and Pakistan's position in the context of global

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nuclear weapons issue now stands.

Nuclear Weapons -The Forgotten Issue and Its urgency:

There is an issue on which, over the last days of this November, the UN Secretary -General Kofi Annan, the current UN Secy general Ban Ki Moon, the World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates, the advisory board to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists consisting of 18 nobels, Heny Kissinger, Sam Nunn, W.Perry and Charles Schulz, Mikhail Gorbachev (all writing in the Wall St Journal) and the Vatican, have all issued dire warnings.

It is an issue that in the 1980's had hundreds of thousands of people in the streets, and which for years and decades has been the subject of resolutions in the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament, and other Legislatures worldwide including the Australian Senate. The resolutions that pass the General Assembly with overwhelming, crunching, majorities of 80% or even 162 to two against, all routinely refer to this issue as a threat to human survival, as did Kofi Annan, the Vatican, Kissinger, Gorbachev and the Nobel Peace Prize - winners so recently.

You'd have thought that this issue would be on the front page of every newspaper. Not so many years ago it was.

Yet statements by eminent people as to its continuing urgency have produced hardly a yawn. That fact should be more worrisome than the issue itself.

The issue is of course, nuclear weapons, the end of the world issue that was, and regrettably, still is. Unfortunately, Public opinion seems to regard it as "yesterdays apocalypse" though so many worthies have clearly indicated that it is, alas, very much today's.

In the 1980s, we literally did expect the world to end next Thursday week or thereabouts, and hundreds of thousands of people mobilised in the streets of cities all over the world. I clearly remember the rallies that took place in Sidney, attended by hundreds of thousands of people.

Opposition to nuclear weapons remains strong in Great Britain where there is a lively campaign on the replacement of Trident nuclear missiles, and I observe, here in India, where the main focus of the debate recently has been the deal with the USA. It is also strong in Western Europe, where the presence of 400 US tactical nuclear weapons seems to concentrate the mind.

The true significance of the nuclear disarmament issue was not lost even on India's Government, in the 80s.

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness".

He was of course, absolutely correct. The problem is that he remains correct even now, as other exalted worthies have so recently testified.

Even Ronald Reagan saw the problem in the 80s. Reagan called for the abolition of "all nuclear weapons", which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilisation". Maikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

We came closer than we knew at that time. We know now that there were more than a dozen times that the fate of living things and humans depended on the correct judgement of stressed military officers or drunken presidents with a background of flashing lights and wailing sirens, and bleeping nuclear briefcases.

Nuclear winter, the probable result of the use of thousands of nuclear warheads, would probably have meant (and though it has gone off the agenda still does mean,) the end of "civilisation" the extinction of most land-based species. And quite possibly the end of humans. However, I must not exaggerate: as a fellow activist once reminded me in an e-mail:

"John, you must not say that the large scale use of nuclear weapons will mean the end of all life. It's just that it might be mostly anaerobic bacteria".

It's nice to be restored to a sense of proportion.

Back then most of us didn't know the ghastly details and mostly we didn't want to know. We knew the stakes were planet-high.

They still are, but we seem to have forgotten or seem not to care. To this day, there are about 2000 strategic warheads in both the US and Russia on permanent "Launch-on-Warning" (LOW) status, able to be launched within minutes - as George Bush hears voices from "God" telling him to do so, or in a moment of computer error, panic, and miscalculation.

We quite literally owe our existence to an unlikely bunch of people - to a Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Soviet Missile Corps who on September 26, 1983 decided not to press a flashing red button, to an unknown assistant to president Yeltsin who in 1995 said as a Norwegian weather research rocket was mistaken for a US first strike, "excuse me Mr. President lets wait another minute", and to a US minuteman commander who ordered heavy military vehicles driven on top of silo doors to physically prevent a launch.

It is to be hoped than in future (if it is not so already) that the peoples in Indian and Pakistani cities will not have to owe their very existence to the cool nerves and quick thinking of some Colonel Singh or Mohamed.

Still for most people, the nuclear weapons issue is an end of the world issue that once was, in a faraway time called the eighties. It was supposed to have ceased in 1990.

So it should have been a shock when Kofi Annan used the occasion of a speech at Princeton University, on 28 Nov last year, to remind us of what we really had no

excuse not to know, that the doomsday nuclear clock is still ticking.

Annans portrayal of the situation should have been shocking. It should have been front - page news.

He reiterated for those of us who have forgotten how it was in the 80s, that:

"These weapons pose a unique threat to humanity as a whole",

And

"Nuclear weapons present a unique existential threat to all humanity".

Nothing has changed in that.

He likened the situation to one in which:

"I said earlier this year that we are "sleepwalking towards disaster". In truth, it is worse than that -We are asleep at the controls of a fast - moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is all too predictable".

Annan stressed in his presentation that both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing. One cannot, as the Bush administration does, go hard on other nations for wanting to have nuclear weapons and then develop plans yourself for "reliable replacement warheads" or "robust nuclear earth penetrators".

According to Annan:

"... The advocates of âœnon-proliferation first" mainly nuclear weapon states and their supporters - believe the main danger arises not from nuclear weapons as such, but from the character of those who posses them, and therefore, from the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and to non-state actors (so called "horizontal proliferation"). The nuclear-weapon states say they have carried out significant disarmament since the end of the cold war, but that their responsibility for international peace and security requires them to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

"Disarmament first" advocates, on the other hand, say that the world is most imperilled by existing nuclear arsenals and their continual improvement (so called "horizontal proliferation"). The nuclear-weapon states say they have carried out significant disarmament since the end of the cold war, but that their responsibility for international peace and security requires them to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

"Disarmament first" advocates, on the other hand, say that the world is most imperilled by existing nuclear arsenals and their continual improvement (so called "vertical proliferation"). Many non-nuclear-weapon states accuse the nuclear-weapon states of retreating from commitments they made in 1955 (when the NPT was extended indefinitely) and reiterated as recently as the year 2000. For these countries, the NPT "grand bargain" has become a swindle. They note that the UN Security Council has often described the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security, but has never declared that nuclear weapons in and of themselves are such a threat. They see no serious movement

movement towards nuclear disarmament, and claim that the lack of such movement presages a permanent "apartheid" between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots".

This is, or has been, Indias own position and that of much of the NAM whose votes still account for 2/3 -3/4 of the planet.

Yet the problem of "nuclear apartheid" is surely not to be solved by giving everyone a nuclear weapon all of their own, or by legitimising ANYONES nuclear arsenal - either that of the US, or Russia, with their omnicidal capabilities, nor the somewhat more modest possibilities of regional apocalypse offered by an India / Pakistan nuclear arms race.

Yet legitimisation of India's nuclear arsenal is perhaps the single most visible effect of the "India/US deal". That Pakistan's arsenal is not similarly legitimised will certainly lead to continued competition with India, and a continuing regional nuclear arms race when what is needed is the opposite - a building of trust and confidence accompanied by a "build-down" of nuclear weapons stocks.

Within 48 hours of Kofi Annans Princeton speech, the Seventh Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates released its final statement from its final statement from its Nov 16 -19 Summit in Rome, underlining the urgency of nuclear weapons elimination.

The Nobel Peace-Prize-winners noted that:

"We, Nobel Peace Laureates and Laureate Organizations, gathered in Rome, Italy, have for years been deeply disturbed by the lack of public attention and political will at the highest levels of state paid to the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. There are over 27.000 of these devices threatening civilisation, with over 95% in the hands of Russia and the US. This danger threatens everyone and thus every person must work to eliminate this risk before it eliminates us".

They pointed amongst other things, as had Kofi Annan, to the absolute lunacy of keeping thousands of nuclear warheads on"launch-on-warning" (LOW) status by the US and Russia.

In 2006, some 44 Nobel laureates had signed a statement that I authored, urging that nuclear weapons be taken off launch-on-warning (LOW) - status.

That statement gathered significant support at the last NPT review conference.

The Rome summit of Nobels pointed to the hypocrisy of passing Security Council resolutions on North Korea while the established nuclear weapon states themselves prepare an entire new generation of nuclear weapons, and issue doctrines for their use that lower the barrier for nuclear weapons use to "show we can do it".

According to the statement:

"Nuclear weapons states want to keep their weapons indefinitely and at the same time condemn others who would attempt to acquire them. Such flaunting of disarmament obligations is not sustainable".

In the weeks leading up to these powerful statements, figures such as Hans Blix had said similar things at much greater length in the WMD Report, which I was

privileged to see him discuss in UN First Committee in October. Blix's WMD Report made exactly the same point that both the Nobels and Annan had made, with respect to the absurd hypocrisy of demanding that others-such as Iran and the DPRK- remain nuclear-weapons-free, while the established nuclear weapons powers flout their clear obligations under the NPT to achieve the total and unequivocal elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Blix WMD Report contained strong recommendations on nuclear weapons operating status, the arcane - sounding phrase under which nucleocrats like to hide the possibility of a combination of computer error and sheer panic that could destroy the world.

And more recently Mr. El Baradei urged strongly a complete moratorium on all nuclear tests, exactly what the CTBT was intended to achieve. A resolution on the CTBT had gone through First Committee 175 votes to one.

"We witness increasing concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and with it the increased danger of both the intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons that could end life as we know it", El Baradei said on 9 Jan, 2007.

On January 17th, 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists advisory board consisting of 18 Nobels, announced that the hands of the iconic "Doomsday Clock" were to be moved from 7 minutes to"midnight" to five minutes to midnight.

The Bulletin noted that:

"We stand at the brink of a second Nuclear Age. Not since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has the world faced such perilous choices. North Korea's recent test of a nuclear weapon, Iran's nuclear ambitions, a renewed emphasis on the military utility of nuclear weapons, the failure to adequately secure nuclear materials, and the continued presence of some 26,000 nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia are symptomatic of a failure to solve the problems posed by the most destructive technology on Earth".

Again, the India/US nuclear "deal" is a major factor in generating this "second nuclear age" Instead of putting the genie back in its bottle, or at least making him feel as unwelcome as possible, the Indian nuclear genie (but not the Pakistani one) is being propitiated and given respect. Rival genies will not be impressed and will try to grow at least as strong as the Indian one.

A major feature of the regional nuclear arms race has been the testing of nuclear-capable missiles by both India and Pakistan. Others have also not been slow to test missiles.

Alarmingly, in the last few weeks of 2006, the French (M-51 SLBM), the Russians (SS-19 ICBM), the Pakistanis (Ghauri) the Indians (Agni, then Prithvi then two Prithvis at once) and then again Pakistan (another more advanced Ghauri/Hatf)-have all tested missiles. Back last June/July, when the DPRK tested 7 missiles, the DPRK test had been immediately preceded by a US Minuteman -III test, then followed by another Minuteman - III test and then a Russian Bulava SLBM test, and a Topol-M test. At the end of November 2006 the Indians had done three missile tests in one week, with two Pakistani tests. There is a real missile-testing race.

I note that even within days of the signature of a nuclear risk reduction agreement between India and Pakistan - surely itself an unequivocally GOOD thing - Pakistan has again tested a nuclear capable missile, and I understand that India also plans further Agni and Prithvi missile tests.

Every single one of these nuclear missile tests (with the exception of an Angi test, which did not go according to expectations), worked with utter lethal perfection. The Bulava SLBM, which had been having troubles, flew faultlessly from the warheads. The SS19, a now aging missile, demonstrated it was capable of taking out Sydney or New York as it had been during the 80s.

On the other hand, the DPRK test of July failed in its most ambitious objective, to launch a Taepo-Dong missile that should have been able to hit the US, though its seven Nodong missiles worked perfectly.

The DPRK test attracted worldwide condemnation and a UN Security Council resolution. The other tests attracted no notice at all, apart from self âœ“ congratulatory articles in the Times of India.

Positive Developments in UN First Committee

Not all was dark however. In October and early November, UN First Committee had passed a serious of thoroughly excellent resolutions, any one of which, were it enforced, would ensure the survival of civilisation and the human species. These resolutions all passed by majorities that ranged from 80% to 175 to 1. As WILPF's Jennifer Nordstrom said, observing First Committee, "The will of the planet for the elimination of nuclear weapons is clear - just look at the indicator board".

I would draw attention not only to Australia's and Japan's Renewed Determination Toward the Total Elimination of nuclear weapons, which passed by a massive majority, but to India's own Reducing Nuclear Dangers, a worthy resolution that focuses on the lowering of nuclear weapons operating status, as well as pointing toward a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

An effort needs to be made in the General Assembly to get wider support for this excellent resolution. It is a pity that while such a worthy set of word is passed in the General Assembly, the subcontinent itself is going more and more onto a perilous hair-trigger basis a command and control systems are centralised and automated, though missile flight times are so short that Launch-on-Warning is not possible. If only India itself were to follow the recommendations of its own UN resolution!

However, the mere deliberations of representatives of the entire planet on matters that affect human survival, are of no interest to media. The fact that more than 95% of all governments believe that nuclear weapons should not exist is deemed unworthy of media attention. Votes in the GA and first committee are just not considered news, though NGOs pay considerable attention to them, because they represent the collective will of the entire planet with respect to issues that are, literally, life and death for the world.

India and Pakistan in the Wider Global Disarmament Picture

So where do India and Pakistan fit into the wider global picture on nuclear disarmament or the lack there of?

Is the world again on the brink of ending, as it did more times than we then knew in the 1980s, tomorrow or the day after? Should I stock up on tinned food, Tom Lehrer and Dies Irae CDs, and head for the hills?

Perhaps not just yet, though the moving of the hands of the Doomsday Clock ought to give cause for deep thought and concern. We are officially at five minutes to midnight. The nearest we have ever been is 2 minutes in 1953, and 3 minutes in the 1980s, though it is arguable that the Serpukhov -15 incident alone should have placed us at about one minute. Still the consensus of the worlds physicists and arms control experts is that we significantly closer to global obliteration than we have been for quite some time and the clock is moving in the wrong direction.

But the nuclear disarmament process which was supposed to result in the elimination of the nuclear arsenals of the established nuclear weapons powers approximately 30 years ago, and whose legally binding nature has been reaffirmed by the ICJ and then in UNGA resolution after resolution, has simply not happened.

Notwithstanding the recent risk-reduction agreement, the risk of a sub continental mini-apocalypse is very real and as time goes on the mega tonnage involved inexorably grows. Measures to automate, computerise, and centralise, nuclear command and control will have the perverse effect of making an accidental exchange all the more likely and all the more lethal.

Current Bush administration policies, based on "do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do", do nothing to improve matters. They give nations such as Iran, who do not currently have a nuclear weapons capability but look as if they might possibly be thinking of getting one somewhere down the line, every reason to get one in spite of the current Fatwa that says that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. These same Bush administration policies of intimidation and threats of regime change give the DPRK every possible incentive to hang on to and to improve, their nuclear deterrent, to improve their delivery capabilities, and to stubbornly refuse to denuclearise.

Those same policies give Iran every reason to place the highest priority possible on obtaining a nuclear "deterrent".

Needless to say I regard the US/Indian nuclear agreement as inherently proliferative since it in effect "rewards" or at least normalises, a country that has decided to obtain its nuclear deterrent, and that continues to develop that deterrent. It is yet another element in a US non-strategy on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that erodes the already too weak provisions of the NPT which remains the chief bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons to a larger and larger group of countries. India should not be seeking legitimation for its nuclear weapons. It should seek to get rid of them, and to lead the world to their elimination.

A mutual agreement by both India and Pakistan to end their nuclear rivalry could be the catalyst that might turn the tide of further nuclear weapons development and further horizontal proliferation back toward the goal of nuclear abolition.

Who has what and how many?

Let's get a bit of perspective by looking at the numbers.

There are roughly 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, of which 95% are in the hands of the US and Russia. (The actual number is a bit rubbery because of the decommissioning process, which leaves open questions like, when does a warhead cease to be a warhead once it is no longer in the "operational" category).

The 95% of the worlds warheads provide the US and Russia with the unique capability to undo billions of years of evolution in about 40 very bad minutes, an ability they do not seem to want to lose in spite of the fact that it is illegal and they are legally committed to eliminate it. Of these warheads, roughly 10,000 are in the hands of the US and a very rubbery 15,000 in the hands of Russia.

Recent Russian threats to abrogate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in response to the proposed placement of US missile defence installations in Polland and the Czech republic (never mind that missile defence cannot work at all) are not a good sign.

Of that number, approximately 2000-2,500 each in Russia and the US are in what is termed "Launch-on-warning" (LOW) status, and it is this number that give the US and Russia that unique planetocidal / omnicidal capability.

According to the computer simulations that used to be done up to about 1990, roughly 200-500 megaton-sized warheads, used for "city busting" (i.e the incineration of most of the worlds population living in the 200-500 largest cities), causes the "nuclear winter" effect to kick in, giving rise to darkness and sub-zero temperatures as far south as Amazonia.

(There's cheery diagram produced in a text by the then Soviet Academy of Science in 1986, showing Amazonia and Congo snap-frozen).

More recent studies of nuclear winter by Brian Toon and others, performed last year, simply reiterate what we already knew: The use of large numbers of nuclear weapons will cause global climatic impacts of a dramatic nature that dim the light of the sun, radically lowering temperatures worldwide. Toons more recent studies also look at the effects of a "mini-nuclear-winter", by which he means really, an India-Pakistan conflict using one or two dozen warheads. Toon concludes that this, while it would not mean the immediate end of civilisation worldwide, would also provoke global cooling effects as well as casualties in the tens of millions to the hundreds of millions.

A significant India-Pakistan nuclear exchange would have, according to Toons studies, global effects lasting at least for years, and most probably decades.

Next rung down the ladder are China, France, and Israel, each with appx 350- 450 weapons (Israel has between 200 and 400, China 250-450).

China has -or had - a mere 20 Dong Feng - 5 long - range ICBMs, pointed at the US, though upgrades seem more and more likely, and it is more and more likely that these weapons will be placed on LOW status.

Next down the ladder are India and Pakistan, and the UK.

India, has an arsenal that at the upper estimates could be the same size as that of the UK (whose 150 warheads are placed in trident submarines whose replacement is now the subject of bitter debate). A range of estimates exist for India's nuclear arsenal. It is more usual to assume however, that India's arsenal is closer to 50 warheads than to the 150 warheads sometimes quoted. Perhaps a realistic number is 75-100 warheads. It does seem likely that in the not too far distant future, assuming current trends continue, India's nuclear arsenal may overtake that of the UK at least in terms of numbers.

India's means of delivery has been Su-29 and Mirage aircraft but is increasingly the Agni and Prithvi missiles so recently tested, and whose testing is ongoing.

Pakistan has fewer warheads than India (50-75), but may have a more sophisticated North-Korea-derived missile delivery system. The Ghauri missile (named after a seventh-century scourge of the Hindu kingdoms of India), is based on the DPRK Nodong missile, and Pakistani missile tests were regularly attended by DPRK personnel. Pakistan also has the Shaheen missile, derived from Chinese technology, and there is an ongoing testing and development program for both Shaheen and Ghauri missiles.

Recent satellite pictures suggest that Pakistan may be increasing its capacity to produce not only enriched uranium on which its warhead program has been based, but to produce plutonium, and that an increased pace of warhead production may be in the offing.

There is also some evidence that Indian production capacities for bomb material may be being augmented, notably its capability to produce highly enriched uranium.

Missile-flight time from Pakistani launch sites to Delhi is of the order of two minutes. (From Siberia to New York it is about 30 minutes). Islamabad and New Delhi place increasing reliance on computerised centralised control systems.

It is arguable that this also places them increasingly and perilously, on a hair-trigger basis, raising the risk of accidental nuclear war to an unacceptable degree. However it is more than a technical quibble to note that this short flight-time means that Indian and Pakistani missiles cannot be placed on Launch-on-warning as there will be no warning to speak of. However they CAN be placed on a hair-trigger basis in which terminal accidents and miscalculations can take place.

It would be important, if frightening, to know what near misses and glitches if any have already occurred.

During the 2002/2003 India/Pakistan crises, in which a million men fought artillery duels across the "line of control", In December 2002, the most prominent wire story in the world's was India, Pak move nukes to line of control'. Such a move, had it taken place, (there have been denials that it did) - would have placed nuclear missiles in positions in which they were very likely to have been fired.

In spite of the denials, the story may have its basis in a decision - a foolish one in my view - to move relatively short -range truck-mounted Prithvi missiles closer to the line of control, and corresponding Pakistani moves.

A slightly different version of this story has it that Pakistan moved Shaheen missiles closer to the LOC, and that India responded by saying its Prithvi missiles had been in the equivalent position for some time. This different version has a different date (May), so it is possible that both may be true.

Both parties Prime minister and Presidents admitted after the dust began to settle in 2003, that it had been "close". Pentagon computer projections obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists indicated that the body-count, should a nuclear "exchange" have happened between the two would have been up to 150 million.

The DPRK

Finally -at the bottom of the list -we have the little DPRK, whose nuclear test seems to have been a bit underwhelming and may not have worked as planned.

(However, I have seen at least one news story according to which when the DPRK phoned the Chinese to warn of the test, they forecast its yield as around what it actually turned out to be. This is also consistent with reported DPRK concerns as to what a larger test might do to the mountainous area in which it took place).

We will have to watch carefully to see if the most recent agreement between the US and the DPRK works out. Scepticism and at least a little suspension of judgement may be required. Neither however should we be too quick to rush to judgement that the DPRK has not fulfilled its side of the bargain, a judgement the DPRK on its side may all too quickly form of the US.

Oh, and Iran??

At the latest, a "highly classified" CIA estimate seems, according to Hersch, to have indicated that Iran has no indication of a nuclear weapons program.

Given the insistence that Iran has made that they don't have one, given the Fatwa, which one would have thought would have some status in an ultra-Moslem society, and given Iran's rather good record in UN First Committee, one is less than surprised by the CIA assessment, nor is one surprised it was "highly classified".

The world is buzzing with numerous and analyses suggestions that military strikes against Iran are imminent (anytime between next week and sometime in the next 2-3 years), and that such strikes "May" (whatever that means), include a tactical nuclear

component, possibly the use of bunker buster bombs against the installations at Ishfahan.

Even more apocalyptic scenarios exist in which larger thermonuclear weapons are used to create EMP and knock out every electrical and electronic device in Iran. It is hard to know whether this has a basis in reality or not, as "sources" are invariably anonymous, but the sheer volume of such speculations is itself worrying and is in itself destabilising.

Israel is said to be seeking US agreement to allow Israeli nuclear - armed fighter bombers to fly toward Iran.

It is hard to know how to evaluate such claims. There have been warnings for months and years that military action against Iran may be imminent, but so far it has not taken place.

A nuclear strike against Iran, should it take place, would be a watershed far far more significant than 9/11 ever was and would move the world into a much more terrifying (and objectively dangerous) era in which the use of nuclear weapons had been "normalised" with potentially terminal consequences for human survival.

Where Can we Go from Here?

The Vatican, Secretary-General Annan, Kissinger, Gorbachev and the Noels as well as the General Assembly are worried and they are right to be worried. The situation with nuclear weapons is getting worse and not better, and the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used someplace is getting inexorably greater. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are inexorably linked and non-progress on proliferation. Inasmuch as the US-India "Deal" discourages BOTH disarmament (because it legitimates existing nuclear weapons) and encourages proliferation (because it legitimates nuclear weapons that ought not to be legitimated), it helps to move the Doomsday clock-hands toward that fateful midnight.

Governments worldwide have not given nuclear disarmament the priority that it needs in spite of the near-unanimity at a global level that it is a priority for human survival. The right noises - or some of them - keep on being made at disarmament conferences (and it is utterly vital that they keep on being made), but we must go beyond making the right noises and agreeing to the right words important as that is and move to doing the right things.

India and Pakistan could do much by starting with bona-fide confidence- building measures (some of which are taking place-sort of), by not undermining those measures by testing missiles within days of their signature, and by engaging in a sub continental Détente.

From there we need to move toward the US and Russia going beyond the minimal and undefined reductions in the Moscow Treaty to really fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the NPT to eliminate their nuclear arsenals as per the clear language, multiple times reaffirmed, of that treaty.

That also needs to embrace the early and universal ratification of the CIBT and of a verifiable FMCT. India and Pakistan could have a vital role to play in this.

Finally, the capstone, a nuclear weapons convention that would forever outlaw nuclear weapons as chemical and biological weapons have been outlawed, needs to be put in place.

This is hardly a radical agenda, having been reiterated many times by both NGOs and governments. But it is one that is essential for the survival of civilisation in the medium term.

Peace activists need to put nuclear disarmament much higher up our own agenda, and demand that our governments take strong action to eliminate nuclear weapons as the people and governments of the world so clearly desire. Peace activists at least in the US and Australia, have not given the nuclear weapons issue nearly enough importance.

India and Pakistan, as sub continental powers that have significant nuclear arsenals and who have more than once threatened each other with mutual incineration have a vital role to play in taking the apocalypse OFF the worlds agenda once and for all.

By doing so, we will not just make history, but make history possible.

Kofi Annans Princeton Speech of 28 Nov. 2006:

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10767.doc.htm

Rome Declaration of Nobel Peace Laureates:

http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Rome_Declaration_2006.pdf

Nukes wrangle threatens Indian government
By Praful Bidwal*

NEW DELHI - As India's coalition government tries to complete the controversial nuclear cooperation deal with the United States, it finds itself caught between domestic opposition to the agreement from its left-wing allies and pressure from Washington to seal the deal.

For the agreement to be completed, it needs to be approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and must receive unconditional exemption from the rules for nuclear commerce set by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), before it is put up for ratification by the US Congress.

At stake is the survival of India's United Progressive Alliance government, which needs the support of the left for a parliamentary majority. After a second round of talks between the UPA coalition and the left in a 15-member committee three days ago, the two sides seem no closer to reconciling their differences on the deal.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist), India's largest leftist party, has asked the UPA government to put off all talk of completing the deal by six months.

And in a sign that the ruling Congress party could be readying for early elections, Rahul Gandhi, scion of India's famed Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty, was named general secretary of the Congress. Rahul's mother Sonia is the powerful president of the party.

Rahul's great-grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru, grandmother Indira Gandhi and father Rajiv were all prime ministers, and his appointment comes after calls from within the party that he plays a greater political role.

The present government has a mandate until 2009, but many believe that elections will come earlier if the deadlock over the landmark nuclear deal is not settled.

India's leftist parties oppose the deal because they see it as a way of bringing India into the US strategic orbit and of compromising sovereign decision-making on foreign policy, security and nuclear matters. They also have reservations about the economic viability of nuclear-generated electricity, which the deal seeks to promote in a big way.

Other critics of the deal stress that it would weaken the global non-proliferation norm and help India build up its nuclear-weapons arsenal, and hence trigger a dangerous nuclear-arms race in the subcontinent and Asia as a whole.

Meanwhile, the US is setting the timetable for the negotiations process at the IAEA and the NSG. The chief US technical negotiator for the deal, Richard Stratford,

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has said: "The US wants to meet the entire prerequisites of the operationalization of the deal by the end of this year."

Washington has told India that it wants to present the deal formally for approval at the NSG's meeting in South Africa on November 11. This means that India will have to negotiate a special inspections (safeguards) agreement with the IAEA well before that.

The sequencing and timing of the process are being largely determined by the domestic political calculations of the US administration, which is heavily invested in the deal. The administration of President George W Bush would like to present the agreement for the US Congress's ratification soon after its winter break.

"This only leaves a narrow window of opportunity for pushing the deal quickly through Congress," said M V Ramana, an independent nuclear-affairs analyst at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development in the Indian city of Bangalore.

"Clearly, the Bush administration feels that it can use the deal before the next presidential election in favor of the Republican Party by touting it as a major foreign-policy achievement - in contrast to Iraq and Afghanistan. That's why it seems to be in a hurry to speed up the negotiations process."

Added Ramana: "There may be yet another calculation, too. President Bush's advisers know that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh faces serious domestic opposition to the deal, and they probably want to help him by building countervailing pressure against the left."

However, the United States' pressure tactics may have the opposite effect. They could well precipitate a major confrontation between the UPA and the leftist parties, leading to the unraveling of the government. So far, the left has desisted from threatening to topple the government.

Last month, the UPA and the left agreed to set up a joint committee to resolve differences on the deal.

They have focused, in particular, on a special law called the Henry J Hyde Act passed by the US Congress last December, and the "123" agreement signed between the two governments this past July to amend Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act so as to permit nuclear cooperation with India, although it has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is a de facto nuclear-weapons state.

The UPA has made no specific commitment to stop taking steps to complete the deal until the committee completes its deliberations, but it was agreed that "the operationalization of the deal will take into account the committee's findings".

A speeded-up negotiation process with the IAEA and the NSG is likely to muddy the waters of the UPA-left talks and might lead to their collapse. The Communist Party of India recently warned that if the government held talks with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement at its general conference in Vienna, the CPI would regard it as a "breach of trust".

Indian Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar did address the IAEA meeting last week, but refrained from making a specific mention of the US-India nuclear deal during his speech. However, he held informal consultations with IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei and nuclear officials from different countries.

It is uncertain, however, if the deal will sail smoothly through the IAEA, and especially the NSG.

Although the IAEA bureaucracy, and ElBaradei in particular, is sympathetic to the deal, the agency's board of governors may not be unanimous in conceding India's demand for a special safeguards protocol, which limits inspections on Indian facilities to the period during which they receive imported supplies. Typically, the IAEA demands safeguards in perpetuity.

Indian officials are hopeful that along with their US counterparts they will be able to persuade the board.

"Securing exceptional exemptions for India from the NSG might prove even more difficult," argued Achin Vanaik, professor of international relations and global politics at the University of Delhi. "Several members of the group have reservations about making a special, indeed unique, exception for India because that will damage the global non-proliferation regime. Some, such as New Zealand, Ireland and the Nordic states, have expressed their opposition".

"Even countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Japan seem inclined not to grant an unconditional exemption to India. It is hard to tell if combined lobbying by India, the US and other supporters of the deal like Britain, France and Russia will bring the fence-sitters on board. And what position China will adopt remains the greatest unknown," Vanaik said.

Beijing is known to favor a "criteria-based" generic approach, rather than a country-specific one, to the question of exempting de facto nuclear-weapons powers such as India and Pakistan from the tough regime of NSG rules. It also enjoys a remarkably friendly relationship with Pakistan, and would not like to see India acquire more nuclear weapons as a consequence of the US deal.

However, China may not want to be the sole NSG member state to be seen to be opposing the US-India nuclear deal. It will probably wait to see how other countries play their cards before revealing its own hand.

Said Vanaik: "If the NSG negotiations get significantly delayed because of opposition or reservations, the deal might get jeopardized. The US Congress will soon get preoccupied with domestic issues as the presidential election approaches. And it is far from clear if Bush will have the political capital or the ability to push the deal through once he becomes a proper lame duck."

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Abolition 2000
Media Release
27 July 2007

ABOLITION 2000 Calls on the International Community to Reject the US-India Nuclear Agreement

The United States and India have agreed on details of an agreement (referred to as a 123 agreement after the section in the US Atomic Energy Act) that will exempt India from long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade. It is believed that the leaders of the two countries will sign the agreement in the next few weeks.

ABOLITION 2000's US-India Working Group(1) calls on the international community to reject this agreement for the reasons outlined below. In the near future it plans to contact all members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) to urge them not to give in to pressure from the US and India.

No details of the agreement have been announced, but it is expected that key features will be the unusual arrangement for a dedicated reprocessing facility and U.S. fuel supply assurances to India. Such attempts to finesse concerns about compliance with US law (the Atomic Energy Act and the Hyde Act) ignore broader concerns. By exempting India from international rules governing trade in nuclear technology, the agreement threatens to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation order and thereby the prospects for global nuclear disarmament.

Since its nuclear test in 1974, India has been subject to sanctions on trade in nuclear technology. After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the United Nations Security Council responded by condemning the tests and calling on both countries to immediately stop their nuclear weapon development programs (Resolution 1172). It also encouraged all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist the nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan.

In addition to violating Security Council Resolution 1172, the agreement also risks violating the United States' NPT obligations. Article I of the NPT prohibits nuclear-weapon states from assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in any way to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the US-India agreement would allow for the transfer of sensitive reprocessing under certain circumstances and would free up India's limited supply of domestic nuclear fuel, which can directly or indirectly help its unsafeguarded nuclear weapons program. (Note that India is not recognized as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT.) Despite developing and testing nuclear weapons outside the framework of the NPT, India is getting more favorable treatment than any NPT state with which the United States has a nuclear cooperation agreement. This is in part because the agreement would grant India consent to reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel without ensuring that its entire nuclear fuel cycle complex is under safeguards.

take meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament. For example, it could agree to stop producing fissile materials and join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But the agreement offers nothing of the sort. It represents a hasty attempt to cobble together something before the end of President Bush's term in office.

Note: ABOLITION 2000 is a network of over 2000 organizations in more than 90 countries world wide working for a global treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. The US-India Working Group was established at ABOLITION 2000's Annual General Meeting held during the May 2007 NPT PrepCom in Vienna.

ABOLITION 2000 lobbied governments at the NPT PrepCom. Since then, the Working Group has been lobbying members of the NSG, all of which must accept the US-India Agreement in order for it to proceed. The Working Group includes members from 7 of the 45 NSG countries, plus members from India

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Resolution and Report

The seminar was held at the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization headquartered in Cairo in collaboration with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India and a number of other local/international organizations (the list is included in the short report). Friends of the Earth Australia is a prominent international organization participating. The international organizations endorsing the seminar include, amongst others, the Mayors for Peace.

Resolution

The International Seminar on "Indo-US Nuclear 'Deal' - India, South Asia, NAM and the Global Order" held in Mumbai, on March 10-11 was organized by a number of local organizations, as per the attached list 'A', and endorsed/participated by the international organizations, as per the attached list 'B'.

After due and in-depth deliberations in which a number of international and national experts and activists took part, the Seminar has resolved as under:

I. What the Deal Is All About?

The content of the 'Deal', which is currently being negotiated between India and the US, was first laid out the joint statement issued by the Indian Prime minister and the US President on July 18 2005 from Washington DC and then further reiterated on March 2 2006 in another joint statement by them issued from New Delhi incorporating the major elements of agreements between the countries reached till then. The signing of the Henry Hyde Act on December 18 2006, after protracted and nerve-wracking deliberations in the US Congress, by the US President towards amending its own Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to make the 'Deal' possible is a major step forward towards bringing the 'Deal' into force.

The 'Deal', in its essence, is meant to enable India, a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), henceforth to have 'civilian' nuclear trade – in terms of nuclear fuel, technology, plants, spares etc., with the US, and also other nations so desirous, by making a unique exception in case of India. India in return will have to designate, at its own options, its nuclear reactors into two categories – 'civilian' (for power production) and 'strategic' (for Bomb making), and ensure separation between the two. The 'civilian' reactors/plants only will be opened up for international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nuclear trade will accordingly be limited to the 'civilian' reactors only. In case of the 'strategic' ones, there will be neither any inspection nor any trade.

II. When and How the 'Deal' Comes into Operation?

In order to bring the 'Deal' into force, India will have to further finalise the "123 agreement" with the US, laying down the specific scope and terms of cooperation and codifying the modes of separation between the 'civilian' and 'strategic' plants - and perhaps diluting some of the conditions incorporated in the Henry Hyde Act at the instance of the US Congress to which India is objecting; and conclude a treaty

with the IAEA on the specific scope and terms of inspection.

Then the proposal will go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group so that it unanimously amends its rules, which as of now prohibits nuclear trade with India – being a non-signatory to the NPT, to accommodate the above two agreements reached between India, on the one hand, and the US and the IAEA on the other.

On succeeding in obtaining a green signal from the NSG, the whole package will go back to the two houses of the US Congress, which stands reconfigured since, for its final nod.

In the event of obtaining such, the US President would put his signature and the 'Deal' will eventually come into operation.

The Indian government, unlike its US counterpart, is not obligated to obtain any parliamentary approval.

III. Why the 'Deal' Must Be Opposed?

The 'Deal' as and when, and if at all, comes through will grievously undermine the current global regime of nuclear non-proliferation, as it is meant to make a unique exception in case India, in gross violation of the underlying principles of the NPT, and thereby also the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. The fact that Pakistan has been brusquely refused a similar deal by the US in spite of persistent clamouring and Iran is being demonstratively coerced to desist from developing its own nuclear fuel cycle technology, integral to nuclear power production allowed and encouraged under the Article IV of the NPT, further brings out graphically the abominable discriminatory nature of the 'Deal'. Moreover, the lesson that one would tend to learn is that if one can weather the initial storms of international censures after breaking the non-proliferation taboo, things would normalise in a while. One may even get rewarded in the process. This is sure to trigger off stepped up vertical and horizontal proliferations.

Moreover, by enabling India to import fuel, natural or enriched uranium, from abroad, the 'Deal' would make it possible for India to use the indigenously produced uranium exclusively for Bomb-making. This possible escalation in its fissile material production capacity is, in all likelihood, push Pakistan further to nuclearise even at a great cost, and thereby aggravate tensions and accelerate arms race in the region with spine-chilling consequences.

It'd also further cement the growing (unequal) strategic ties between the US and India and thereby would add momentum to the US project for unfettered global dominance and Indian craze to emerge as a global power basking in the reflected glory of the global headman. It'd just not only undermine India's position as a founding and leading member of the NAM, it'd also pose a very serious challenge to the NAM and its objectives in terms of radically raised level of US domination on the global scene.

India's rather meek submission to highly deplorable and dangerous threats issued and postures adopted by the Bush regime in relation to Iran and its nuclear

programme instead of trying to find a just and fair solution in terms of having a Weapons of Mass Destruction free Middle-East including Israel is a clear and extremely worrisome pointer. India's keenness to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) initiated by the US to interdict any vessel in international waters suspected of carrying (unauthorised!) nuclear materials, in gross violation of all international laws and also the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme of the US are another two highly disturbing indicators.

India's growing closeness with Israel, the frontline state of the US in the Middle East, would also pick up further pace in the process.

This 'Deal' would obviously distort India's energy options by diverting scarce resources to developments of resource-guzzling, intrinsically hazardous and potentially catastrophic, nuclear power at the cost of ecologically benign renewable sources of energy.

This would, furthermore, provide a strong boost to the nuclear industry worldwide, particularly the potential suppliers from the US. And that's precisely why the business lobby in the US is working overtime to get the 'Deal' clinched.

The recent visit by the Russian President Vladimir Putin to India as the guest of honour at the Republic Day event and his public commitment to supply additional nuclear reactors to India and work for the safe passage of the 'Deal' through the NSG underscores the convergence of interests of the nuclear power lobbies worldwide as regards the 'Deal' and the new market that it is promising to open up.

IV. We Demand

The government of India, given the grave multifaceted negative implications of this ongoing deal, must forthwith withdraw from all further negotiations with the US in this regard.

It must strive to regain its old prestige and influence, both moral and political, by opting to again play a meaningful leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement and other international alliances geared against imperialism, militarism and oriented towards a nuclear weapons free South Asia and the world.

The government of India is further urged to make global abolition of nuclear weapons its diplomatic priority and take up and pursue the issue vigorously with the NAM, UNGA and other international fora.

V.

The Seminar also decides to send a copy of this Resolution to the Prime Minister of India, the Chairperson of the ruling UPA – Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the incumbent chair of the NAM – the Cuban government, and also the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon.

It also urges the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to turn down the proposal to amend its rule to accommodate the 'Deal', as and when it come sup for discussions.

'A'

Indian Organisers:

- Akshara
- Bombay Urban Industrial League for Development (BUILD)
- Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS)
- Church's Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA)
- Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP)
- Documentation & Research Training Centre (DRTC)
- Forum for Justice & Peace (FJP)
- Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament &
- Environmental Protection
- Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD)
- Initiative India
- Institute Community Organization & Research (ICOR)
- Labour Education and Research Network (LEARN)
- National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM)
- Pakistan India Peoples' Forum for Peace & Democracy (PIPFPD)
- Peace Mummbai
- People's Media Initiative (PMI)
- Vikas Adhyayan Kendra (VAK)
- Wisdom Foundation
- Women's Centre
- Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA))

'B'

International Organisations Endorsing:

- Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO)
- Friends of the Earth Australia
- Mayors for Peace
- South Asian Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE)
- South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy (SANSAD), Canada

Event Details

- 10.3.2007 (SATURDAY)

10: 00-11: 00: Registration & Inauguration.

Welcome Speech: Admiral (Rtd.) L Ramdas (PIPFPD/CNDP).

- 11: 00-14: 00: **1st Plenary: 'Indo-US Nuke Deal: India, Non-Aligned Movement and the Emerging Global Order'.**

Speakers: Achin Vanaik (CNDP), A.A.M Marleen PC (Secretary-General, AAPSO, Sri Lanka), Ashim Roy (General Secretary, NTUI), Ms. Hamsa Abd El-Hamid (International Secretariat, AAPSO, Cairo).

Chair: Fr. Allwyn D'Silva (FJP/ICOR).

- 15: 00-18 :00: **2nd Plenary: 'Indo-US Nuke Deal: Its Impacts on Global and Regional Nuclear Arms Race'.**

Speakers: John Hallam (Friends of the Earth, Australia), E.A.Vidyasekera (AAPSO Secretariat Coordinator), Hari Sharma (President, SANSAD, Canada) - speech read out in absentia, Praful Bidwai (CNDP).

Chair: Vijay Darp (PIPFPD).

March 11 (SUNDAY)

- 10: 00-13: 00: **3rd Plenary: 'Indo-US Nuke Deal: Its Impacts on Global and Regional Energy Options'.**

Speakers: Surendra Gadekar (CNDP/Anumukti), V T Padmanabhan (Researcher on radiation effects on human heath), M V Ramana (CNDP).

Chair: Leslie Rodrigues (VAK).

- 14: 00-18 : 00: 4th Plenary:

Documentary film by K P Sasi on effects of radiation (from thorium) on human health.

Strategy Session and Adoption of Resolution.

Speakers: Theodore Orlin (President, International Human Rights Education Consortium, USA), Sandeep Pandey (NAPM/CNDP), Eric Toussaint (CADTM, Belgium) and others.

Chair: Sukla Sen (CNDP).

Discussion on Film

- Speaker: V T Padmanabhan.

Chair: Sushovan Dhar (VAK).

Thanksgiving

March 12 (Monday)

03 :30 – 04: 30:

Press Conference

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